His conception of mental representations defines these representations as computational structures with content that are susceptible to mental transformations. Wilkenfeld constructs a necessary condition on objectual understanding around this definition. More generally, though, it is important to note that Khalifa, via his grasping argument, is defending reliable explanatory evaluation as merely a necessarythough not sufficientcomponent of grasping. A. and Gordon, E. C. Norms of Assertion: The Quantity and Quality of Epistemic Support. Philosophia 39(4) (2011): 615-635. Fifthly, to what extent might active externalist approaches (for example, extended mind and extended cognition) in epistemology, the ramifications of which have recently been brought to bear on the theory of knowledge (see Carter, et. . In all these cases, epistemology seeks to understand one or another kind of cognitive success (or, correspondingly, cognitive failure ). A monograph that explores the nature and value of achievements in great depth. Hempel, C. Aspects of Scientific Explanation and Other Essays in the Philosophy of Science. Gettier, E. Is Justified True Belief Knowledge? Analysis 23 (6) (1963). Epistemological Problems of Perception - Stanford Encyclopedia of This is perhaps partially because there is a tendency to hold a persons potential understanding to standards of objective appropriateness as well as subjective appropriateness. A good example here is what Riggs (2003) calls intelligibility, a close cousin of understanding that also implies a grasp of order, pattern and connection, but does not seem to require a substantial connection to truth. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2001. Elgin, C. Exemplification, Idealization, and Understanding in M. Surez (ed. Firstly, grasping is often used in such a way such that it is not clear whether it should be understood metaphorically or literally. Sliwa, P. IVUnderstanding and Knowing. Nevertheless, considering weakly factive construals of objective understanding draws attention to an important pointthat there are also interesting epistemic states in the neighborhood of understanding. This is the idea that one has shifted, or changed, the way he or she takes in knowledge. The Epistemology Shift, Essay Example In other words, they claim that one cannot always tell that one understands. Contains the paradigmatic case of environmental epistemic luck (that is, the fake barn case). In . Since, for instance, the ideal gas law (for example, Elgin 2007) is recognized as a helpful fiction and is named and taught as such, as is, nave Copernicanism or the simple view that humans evolved from apes. Often-cited discussion of the fake barn counterexample to traditional accounts of knowledge that focus on justified true belief. If so, then the internally consistent delusion objection typically leveled against weakly nonfactive views raises its head. This skeptical argument is worth engaging with, presumably with the goal of showing that understanding does not turn out to be internally indistinguishable from mere intelligibility. Her line is that understanding-why involves (i) knowing what something is, and (ii) making reasonable sense of it. For as in testimony cases in friendly environments, where knowledge acquisition demands very little on the part of the agent), he argues that cognitive achievement is not essentially wedded to knowledge (as robust virtue epistemologists would hold). This view, while insisting that central beliefs must all be true, is flexible enough to accommodate that there are degrees of understandingthat is, that understanding varies not just according to numbers of true beliefs but also numbers of false, peripheral beliefs. On such an interpretation, explanationism can be construed as offering a simple answer to the object question discussed above: the object of understanding-relevant grasping would, on this view, be explanations. A more sophisticated understanding has it that human beings and the other great apes descended from a common hominid ancestor (who was not, strictly speaking, an ape). Pritchard, D. Epistemic Luck. These similar states share some of the features we typically think understanding requires, but which are not bona fide understanding specifically because a plausible factivity condition is not satisfied. Though the demandingness of this ability need not be held fixed across practical circumstances. Pros and Cons of Epistemological Shift. Social Sciences - EssayZoo Uses the concept of understanding to underwrite a theory of explanation. According to Zagzebski (2001), the epistemic value of understanding is tied not to elements of its factivity, but rather to its transparency. 121-132. What kind of historical enterprise is historical epistemology? Whether wisdom might be a type of understanding or understanding might be a component of wisdom is a fascinating question that can draw on both work in virtue ethics and epistemology. epistemological shift pros and cons philos201 Assignment Details Recall that epistemology is the branch of philosophy concerned with knowledge. To the extent that such a move is available, one has reason to resist Morriss rationale for resisting Pritchards diagnosis of Kvanvigs case. According to his positive proposal, objectual understanding is the goal and what typically sates the appetite associated with curiosity. The Pros And Cons Of Epistemology - 824 Words | Bartleby Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1989. Knowledge is almost universally taken to be to be factive (compare, Hazlett 2010). epistemological shift pros and cons - kaminokawa-shokokai.net Finally, there is fruitful work to do concerning the relationship between understanding and wisdom. Must they be known or can they be Gettiered true beliefs? Zagzebski notes that this easily leads to a vicious circle because neglect leads to fragmentation of meaning, which seems to justify further neglect and further fragmentation until eventually a concept can disappear entirely.. Grimm (2011) also advocates for a fairly straightforward manipulationist approach in earlier work. Contains Lackeys counterexamples to the knowledge transmission principles. Pritchard, D. Knowing the Answer, Understanding and Epistemic Value. Grazer Philosophische Studien 77 (2008): 325-39. Positivism follows an identical approach as the study of natural sciences in the testing of a theory. There is little work focusing exclusively on the prospects of a non-factive construal of understanding-why; most authors, with a few exceptions, take it that understanding-why is obviously factive in a way that is broadly analogous to propositional knowledge. In order to make this point clear, Pritchard suggests that we first consider two versions of a case analogous with Kvanvigs. Moderate factivity implies that we should withhold attributions of understanding when an agent has a single false central belief, even in cases where the would-be understanding is of a large subject matter where all peripheral beliefs in this large subject matter are true. 1pt1): pp. A Seismic Shift in Epistemology | EDUCAUSE epistemological shift pros and cons. and Pritchard, D. Varieties of Externalism. Philosophical Issues 41(1) (2014): 63-109. Strevens (2013) focuses on scientific understanding in his discussion of grasping. The following sections consider why understanding might have such additional value. Establishes a pro position, supporting that the shift in how people take in knowledge is good. Another seemingly promising lineone that engages with the relation question discussed aboveviews grasping as intimately connected with a certain set of abilities. If a grasping condition is necessary for understanding, does one satisfy this condition only when one exercises a grasping ability to reflect how things are in the world? Grimm (2011) calls this subjective understanding. He describes subjective understanding as being merely a grasp of how specific propositions interlinkone that does not depend on their truth but rather on their forming a coherent picture. This is a change from the past. What is curiosity? 57-74, 2015. Zagzebski does not mean to say that to understand X, one must also understand ones own understanding of X (as this threatens a psychologically implausible regress), but rather, that to understand X one must also understand that one understands X. He claims that while we would generally expect her to have knowledge of her relevant beliefs, this is not essential for her understanding and as a result it would not matter if these true beliefs had been Gettierised (and were therefore merely accidentally true). Working hypotheses and idealizations need not, on this line, be viewed as representative of realityidealizations can be taken as useful fictions, and working hypotheses are recognized as the most parsimonious theories on the table without thereby being dubbed as wholly accurate. Putting this all together, a scientist who embraces the ideal gas law, as an idealization, would not necessarily have any relevant false beliefs. Longworth, G. Linguistic Understanding and Knowledge. Nous 42 (2008): 50-79. Considers some of the ramifications that active externalist approaches might have for epistemology. In so doing, he notes that the reader may be inclined to add further internalist requirements to his reliability requirement, of the sort put forward by Kvanvig (2003). So the kind of knowledge that it provides is metaknowledgeknowledge about knowledge. Khalifa, K. Is Understanding Explanatory or Objectual? Synthese 190(6) (2013a): 1153-1171. That said, Grimms more recent work (2014) expands on these earlier observations to form the basis of a view that spells out grasping in terms of a modal relationship between properties, objects or entitiesa theory on which what is grasped when one has understanding-why will be how changes in one would lead (or fail to lead) to changes in the other. Trout, J.D. In other words, even though there is no such gas as that referred to in the law, accepting the law need not involve believing the law to be true and thus believing there to be some gas with properties that it lacks. One helpful way to think about this is as follows: if one takes a paradigmatic case of an individual who understands a subject matter thoroughly, and manipulates the credence the agent has toward the propositions constituting the subject matter, how low can one go before the agent no longer understands the subject matter in question? The cons of the epistemology shift that is a major concern to philosophers are the loss of, reading and communications since the student do not interact physically, these skills be instilled EPISTEMOLOGY SHIFT 5 by the teachers and through the help of physical environments. He suggests that manipulating the system allows the understander to see the way in which the manipulation influences (or fails to influence) other parts of the system (2011: 11). Specifically, he points out that an omniscient agent who knows everything and intuitively therefore understands every phenomenon might do so while being entirely passivenot drawing interferences, making predictions or manipulating representations (in spite of knowing, for example, which propositions can be inferred from others). Just as we draw a distinction between this epistemic state (that is, intelligibility, or what Grimm calls subjective understanding) and understanding (which has a much stricter factivity requirement), it makes sense to draw a line between grasping* and grasping where one is factive and the other is not. Pritchard (2008: 8) points out thatfor exampleif one believes that ones house burned down because of the actions of an arsonist when it really burnt down because of faulty wiring, it just seems plain that one lacks understanding of why ones house burned down. Janvid, M. Knowledge versus Understanding: The Cost of Avoiding Gettier. Acta Analytica 27 (2012): 183-197. Defends the strong claim that propositional knowledge is necessary and sufficient for understanding. Discusses the connection between curiosity and true belief. Incudes arguments for the position that understanding need not be factive. 2015 Jun;21(3):433-9. doi: 10.1111/jep.12282. As such, Khalifa is not attempting to provide an analysis of grasping. Defends a lack of control account of luck. So, understanding is compatible with a kind of epistemic luck that knowledge excludes. Another significant paper endorsing the claim that knowledge of explanations should play a vital role in our theories of understanding. What (Good) is Historical Epistemology? | MPIWG But is understanding factive? This is a point Elgin is happy to grant. Firstly, achievement is often defined as success that is because of ability (see, for example, Greco 2007), where the most sensible interpretation of this claim is to see the because as signifying a casual-explanatory relationshipthis is, at least, the dominant view. For example, an environment where ones abilities so easily could generate false beliefs of form despite issuing (luckily) true beliefs of the form
on this occasion. Firstly, Kvanvig introduces propositional understanding as what is attributed in sentences that take the form I understand that X (for example, John understands that he needs to meet Harold at 2pm). Riaz, A. Solicitar ms informacin: 310-2409701 | administracion@consultoresayc.co. He says that knowledge about a phenomenon (P) is maximally well-connected when the basing relations that obtain between the agents beliefs about P reflect the agents knowledge about the explanatory and support relations that obtain between the members of the full account of P (2015: 12). The Pros And Cons Of Epistemology. We regularly claim that people can understand everything from theories to pieces of technology, accounts of historical events and the psychology of other individuals. Essentially, this view traditionally holds that understanding why X is the case is equivalent to knowing why X is the case (which is in turn supposed to be equivalent to knowing that X is the case because of Y). This view, embraced by DePaul and Grimm (2009), implies that to the extent that understanding and knowledge come apart, it is not with respect to a difference in susceptibility to being undermined by epistemic luck. This aside, can we consider extending Grimms conception of understanding as non-propositional knowledge of causes to the domain of objectual understanding? Moral Testimony and Moral Epistemology. Ethics 120 (2009): 94-127. Such a theory raises questions of its own, such as precisely what answering reliably, in the relevant sense, demands. This type of a view is a revisionist theory of epistemic value (see, for example, Pritchard 2010), which suggests that one would be warranted in turning more attention to an epistemic state other than propositional knowledgespecifically, according to Pritchardunderstanding. However, Strevens nonetheless offers a rough outline of a parallel, non-factive account of grasping, what he calls grasping*. Dordrecht: Reidel, 1979. The conspiracy theorist possesses something which one who grasps (rather than grasps*) a correct theory also possesses, and yet one who fails to grasp* even the conspiracy theory (for example, a would-be conspiracy theorist who has yet to form a coherent picture of how the false propositions fit together) lacks. For example, he attempts to explain the intuitions in Pritchards intervening luck spin on Kvanvigs Comanche case by noting that some of the temptation to deny understanding here relates to the writer of the luckily-true book himself lacking the relevant understanding. Nevertheless, distinguishing between the two in this manner raises some problems for her view of objectual understanding, which should be unsurprising given the aforementioned counterexamples that can be constructed against a non-factive reading of Bakers construal of understanding-why. Although a range of epistemologists highlighting some of the important features of understanding-why and objectual understanding have been discussed, there are many interesting topics that warrant further research. The surgeons successful bypass is valued differently when one is made aware that it was by luck that he picked an appropriate blood vessel for the bypass. Secondly, one might wonder if Wilkenfelds account of understanding as representation manipulation is too inclusivethat it rules in, as cases of bona fide understanding, representations that are based on inaccurate but internally consistent beliefs. Finally, on the other side of the spectrum from Zagzebski and Kvanvig, and also in opposition with Pritchard, is the view that understandings immunity to epistemic luck is isomorphic to knowledges immunity to epistemic luck.
Va Disability Rating For Groin Pain,
Ocugen Stock Crash 2018,
Hmp Shotts Famous Inmates,
Articles E